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Abstract
Background: Measures taken over the past four years in Greece to reduce pharmaceutical expenditure have led to 
significant price reductions for medicines, but have also changed patient cost-sharing rates for prescription drugs. 
This study attempts to capture the resulting increase in patients’ out-of-pocket (OOP) expenses for prescription 
drugs during the 2011-2014 period.
Methods: The authors conducted a retrospective review of financial data derived from 39 883 prescriptions, 
dispensed at three randomly chosen pharmacies located in Lamia, central Greece.
Results: The study recorded an average contribution rate per prescription as follows: 11.28% for 2011 (95% CI: 
10.76-11.80), 14.10% for 2012, 19.97% for 2013, and 29.08% for 2014. Correspondingly, the mean patient charge per 
prescription for 2011 was €6.58 (95% CI: 6.22-6.94), €8.28 for 2012, €8.35 for 2013, and €10.87 for 2014. During the 
2011-2014 period, mean percentage rate of patient contribution increased by 157.75%, while average patient charge 
per prescription in current prices increased by 65.22%. The use of a newly introduced internal reference price (IRP) 
system increased the level of prescription charge at a rate of 2.41% for 2012 (100% surcharge on patients), 26.24% for 
2013 (49.95% on patients and 50.04% on the appropriate health insurance funds), and 47.72% for 2014 (85.06% on 
patients and 14.94% on funds).
Conclusion: Increased cost-sharing rates for prescription drugs can reduce public pharmaceutical expenditure, but 
international experience shows that rising OOP expenses can compromise patients’ ability to pay, particularly when 
it comes to chronic diseases and vulnerable populations. Various suggestions could be effective in refining the cost-
sharing approach by giving greater consideration to chronic patients, and to the poor and elderly.
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Implications for policy makers
• Policy-makers should take into account proportionality of income along with patient needs – the poor and the elderly need to be protected.
• Policy-makers should promote the use of generic drugs, by examining failed attempts of the past and by implementing policies proven to be 
effective in countries with similar characteristics to Greece.
• The cost-sharing mechanism needs to be flexible and subject to changes depending on its positive and negative results over time.
Implications for the public
Structures and mechanisms need to be put in place to enable awareness of community about cost-sharing through a system of integrity and 
transparency. Adherence to pharmacological treatment has to be monitored in a consistent way in order to assess long-term effects of policy changes 
to the public’s health.
Key Messages 
Background
The ongoing financial crisis in Greece has already led to 
drastic changes in the country’s health sector. Total health 
expenditure fell from 10.1% of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 20091 to 6% in 2014.2 Apart from other health 
reforms, pharmaceutical expenses have been downsized 
from 2.3% of the GDP in 2012 to less than 1% in 2014, below 
the European Union (EU) average of 1.5%.3 This reduction 
was a priority for the government, and it was mandated by 
specific macroeconomic indicators; Greece had one of the 
highest rates of pharmaceutical expenditure among The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries in 2012 (25.2% as a percentage of health 
expenditure compared to the OECD average of 15.9%),3 
whereas public funding for pharmaceuticals was set at 1.5% 
of the GDP in Greece for 2012, which amounted to the 
highest percentage among EU countries.4 Among others, the 
government’s interventions included drug re-pricing, policies 
to promote the use of generics, and changes in the country’s 
prescription drug cost-sharing policy.5
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With respect to cost-sharing, the Greek system functions 
based on three percentage classes, namely 25%, 10%, and 
0%. This means that, depending on the percentage class 
where each disease is classified, the patients face out-of-
pocket (OOP) expenses corresponding to 25%, 10%, or 
0% of the price of the drugs which the physicians prescribe 
for the diseases. Prescribing physicians must be affiliated 
with the National Organization for Healthcare Provision 
(EOPYY) – the country’s major health insurance fund – 
which covers the rest of the amount (75%, 90%, or 100%), 
and the patients must be registered with EOPYY, either 
as pensioners or as insured active workers – the latter pay 
monthly premiums that are normally proportional to their 
income. Uninsured patients have to pay the whole price of 
their drugs themselves, unless they are poor (annual income 
below €5000) and unemployed; in that case, they are entitled 
to free drugs for specific conditions (various restrictions 
apply) until they are employed and, thus, become insured. 
Once they have their physician’s prescription, patients are free 
to choose any community dispensing pharmacy to dispense 
it by paying accordingly 25%, 10%, or 0% of the drug’s 
price to the pharmacist. The recent government reforms re-
classified diseases and their corresponding drugs, by shifting 
more diseases to the highest cost-sharing class of 25%,6,7 
and by leaving some chronic conditions to the class of 10% 
and some life-threatening conditions to the class of 0%.8 In 
essence, this means that very few patients are left with free 
prescription drugs. End-stage chronic renal failure patients 
and paraplegics are amongst those who still get their drugs 
for free, whereas particular exceptions apply to very limited 
populations, such as beneficiaries of state relief funds – that 
is, elderly pensioners below poverty level.
In addition, the government introduced a new internal 
reference price (IRP) calculation system in an effort to further 
contain the cost of pharmaceutical care.9,10 The IRP is set by 
Social Security according to therapeutic categories, and, as 
of 2014 all chemicals and preparations are subject to the IRP 
system. This leads to more OOP expenses for the patient; 
apart from paying 10% or 25% of the drug IRP, the patient 
also has to pay the price difference in case that the drug retail 
price is higher than the IRP.
Considering the above, the challenge for policy-makers 
is to determine whether these measures are effective, by 
achieving a fair allocation of the burden of pharmaceutical 
expenditure at the same time. From 2009 and onwards, public 
pharmaceutical expenditure followed a downward trend, 
from approximately €5.3 billion in 2009 to approximately €2 
billion in 201411; however, a substantial part of this important 
fiscal adjustment is attributed to the patients’ increased OOP 
expenses under the current cost-sharing scheme. The aim 
of this paper is to present the evolution of these expenses 
between 2011 and 2014, that is, the main period in which 
major interventions in the pharmaceutical sector took place.
Methods
Design and Sampling
We performed a retrospective analysis of financial data 
related to medical prescriptions dispensed at three randomly 
chosen community pharmacies. These pharmacies were 
located in the municipality of Lamia, capital city of the 
prefecture of Fthiotida in Central Greece. For the purpose 
of the study, dispensing pharmacists gave us permission to 
access their electronic records by using their professional 
software. In order to take into account the seasonal nature 
of drug prescribing, we chose to examine the following 
time intervals: 1/5/2011-31/8/2011, 1/5/2012-31/8/2012, 
1/5/2013-31/8/2013, and 1/5/2014-31/8/2014. Thus, we were 
able to compare similar periods of different years. During the 
sample collection process we used only financial data deemed 
necessary for this study, and in accordance with Law 2472/97 
on the Protection of Individuals regarding the Processing of 
Personal Data. Microsoft Excel 2007 software was used to 
consolidate all data collected, and SPSS 20.0 was used for the 
statistical analysis.
With regard to the year 2011, we used data consolidated from 
various health and social security funds. This was mandated 
by the high level of fragmentation that existed within health 
insurance before the 2012 reform, as there used to be 108 
different health and social security funds in the public sector. 
Since 2012, a main fund (EOPYY) essentially integrates all 
the other funds and handles all medical prescriptions, thus, 
rendering data processing much easier.
We excluded from the sample prescriptions related to high 
cost medicinal products for the treatment of rare diseases, 
due to changes in the distribution channels of these products 
that coincided with the period of research. Overall, 10 421 
prescriptions were collected for 2011, 8964 prescriptions for 
2012, 9391 prescriptions for 2013, and 11 107 prescriptions 
for 2014, reaching a total sample size of 39 883 prescriptions.
Calculations
We calculated mean prescription cost-sharing values per year 
in a percentage form and at current € prices. Subsequently, 
we calculated percentage changes and price changes between 
years 2012 and 2011, 2013 and 2012, 2014 and 2013, as well 
as 2014 and 2011. In addition, we calculated the average price 
per prescription per year, set at €6.58 for 2011 (95% CI: 6.17-
6.99), €8.28 (95% CI: 7.59 to 8.97) for 2012, €8.35 (95% CI: 
7.59-9.11) for 2013, and €10.87 (95% CI: 9.71-12.03) for 2014.
Concerning the aforementioned IRP system, we measured 
its percentage contribution to the shaping of the patients’ 
OOP expenses separately for each year. Then we estimated 
the distribution of this percentage between EOPYY and 
patients for the corresponding time intervals, based on the 
differing cost-sharing rates for each drug category and each 
year. For the year 2011, there was no difference between the 
drug retail price and the IRP (the new IRP system had not 
been introduced yet). For the year 2012, the price difference 
concerned only 10 active substances (it was the new system’s 
trial period), and the cost burden fell entirely upon the 
patients. For the year 2013, the price difference concerned all 
branded drugs with generic counterparts in the market, and 
it was shared equally between patients and EOPYY. For the 
year 2014, the price difference concerned all substances under 
the following provisions: for drugs with a higher retail price 
than the IRP, the difference is covered entirely by the patient; 
if these drugs have no generic counterpart, the difference is 
equally shared between patients and EOPYY; and finally, for 
drugs with no generic counterpart and with a lower retail price 
than the IRP, the difference is deducted from the anticipated 
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institutionalized patient contribution at half-maximum.12,13 
We also added a fixed fee of €1 per prescription (to be paid by 
the patient), which was introduced that year as a measure to 
control demand.
Results
Table 1 summarizes the results of the data analysis in a 
cumulative format (95% CI), regarding the evolution of 
patients’ OOP expenses over time. Considering the 2011-
2014 period as a whole, there was a cumulative rise of patient 
participation rate by 157.75%.
Table 2 presents the effect of the IRP system on OOP expenses, 
which was pilot tested in 2012 (with patients bearing the full 
cost for 10 selected active substances) and gradually expanded 
as explained above. In 2014, the IRP system contributed to 
patients’ OOP expenses by 47.72%. 
Discussion
The results presented above indicate a rising OOP burden 
for pharmaceutical care in Greece, which can be directly 
attributed to increased cost-sharing rates and the new IRP 
system. Prescription flow does not show any significant or 
consistent changes between different years, as the number of 
prescriptions is reduced for the year 2012 and then it rises 
again, exceeding in 2014 the numbers of 2011. The results 
show that the government has succeeded in reducing public 
pharmaceutical expenditure mainly by shifting more of the 
cost to care recipients. Achieving fiscal targets is crucial to 
the country’s effort to overcome recession, but caution is 
warranted to avoid negative consequences that enhance the 
public’s perception that policy reforms are unfair. Change 
in cost-sharing rates and reference pricing constitute widely 
implemented policies when trying to reduce pharmaceutical 
expenditure, and they have been part of many recent health 
policy reforms internationally.14 Clinical and economic 
outcomes of such policies are difficult to assess; however, 
relevant bibliography suggests that significant implications 
may occur. The main challenge is to rationalize the use of 
drugs in a cost-effective manner, without compromising the 
public’s health.
In general, medication adherence tends to be compromised 
when cost-sharing schemes result to increases in OOP 
expenses.15 Recent systematic reviews show that increased 
cost-sharing policies entail the possibility of reductions 
in the use of life-sustaining drugs, as well as drugs that 
are important in treating chronic conditions.16-18 Reduced 
medication adherence (taking fewer doses, postponing taking 
a medication, failing to fill a prescription at all, and taking 
medication less frequently than prescribed) causes serious 
adverse events, especially for vulnerable populations such 
as the poor and the elderly.19,20 In Italy, a country also hit by 
economic recession, a recent analysis suggests that changes 
in cost-sharing policies were partly successful, in terms 
of greater revenue to the health system, but in the last few 
years, cost-sharing increases would seem to have rebounded 
negatively on more vulnerable families, due to the economic 
crisis.21 In Spain, where a set of cost-sharing reforms on 
pharmaceutical prescriptions with regional variants have been 
established since July 2012, in the context of heavy austerity 
reforms of public financing, a dramatic reduction in the use 
of drugs has already been noted.22 Even in countries without 
serious financial problems, such as Sweden or Australia, large 
increases in cost-sharing impact on patients’ ability to afford 
essential drugs.23,24
There is not yet a large study in Greece from which to deduct 
similar conclusions, but a few studies confirm that patients’ 
ability to pay has been compromised, with potentially serious 
adverse events. For instance, Tsiligianni et al report that 
many chronic patients have begun to reduce or skip doses 
of their prescription medicines,25 whereas Skroumpelos et al 
estimate that increases greater than 50% in chronic patients’ 
participation to medical cost leads to adverse health outcomes 
for more than one-third of these patients.26 More studies 
are needed in order to properly assess the overall impact 
of these policy changes, and to determine whether positive 
consequences outweigh negative ones. For instance, excessive 
drug use is a well-documented problem in Greece,27 which 
could be alleviated under the current cost-sharing scheme. 
However, policy reforms should keep balance between cutting 
unnecessary expenses and protecting vulnerable populations.
Proposals
Literature abounds with suggestions on how to refine cost-
sharing policies in order to achieve better results. An analysis 
Table 1. OOP Expenses and Related Changes, 2011-2014
Year No. of Prescriptions OOP Expenses (%) OOP Expense/
Prescription (€)
OOP Expenses 
Change (%)
Price Difference 
(%)
Average Price per 
Prescription (€)
2011 10 421 11.28 6.58 - - 58.29
2012 8964 14.10 8.28 24.94 25.90 58.73
2013 9391 19.97 8.35 41.63 0.90 41.84
2014 11 107 29.08 10.87 45.66 30.05 37.36
Total 39 883 - - 157.75 65.22 -
Abbreviation: OOP, out-of-pocket.
Table 2. Effect of the IRP System on Total Patient Contribution, 2011-2014
Year No. of Prescriptions Impact of IRP System in OOP Expenses Formulation (%) EOPPY Allocation (%) Patient Allocation (%)
2011 10 421 - - -
2012 8964 2.41 0.00 100.00
2013 9391 26.24 50.04 49.95
2014 11 107 47.72 14.96 85.06
Abbreviations: OOP, out-of-pocket; IRP, internal reference price; EOPYY, National Organization for Healthcare Provision.
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of the impact of cost-sharing changes on the demand for 8 
classes of prescription drugs shows that the influence of cost-
sharing on drug use may be related to characteristics inherent 
to each drug class or underlying condition.28 This means 
that the Greek approach, based solely on three cost-sharing 
categories of 25%, 10%, and 0%, is oversimplified. More 
categories are needed, depending on the underlying diseases. 
Hossein and Gerrard analyzed trends in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Japan, France, and the United States, and found 
that, in spite of higher levels of cost-sharing, OOP spending 
as a percentage of total spending remained unchanged in 
most of these countries because they instituted programs 
to protect certain categories of individuals by creating OOP 
limits, exempting people with certain chronic diseases, or 
eliminating cost-sharing for certain demographic groups and 
low-income people.29 These refinements are very limited in 
Greece, and they need to be carefully examined. Cohn suggests 
a blended approach, citing the French healthcare system, in 
which OOP spending is reduced for the sick and the poor, by 
waiving cost-sharing for chronic conditions.30 Riggs and Ubel 
emphasize on the role of prescribing physicians, who can help 
to ensure that their patients achieve the best financial and 
medical outcome, by helping them navigate trade-offs related 
to their OOP costs.31
In Cyprus, a country with close geographical and cultural 
proximity to Greece, major healthcare reforms are currently 
taking place as a response to financial crisis, and experts design 
pharmaceutical policies which should not compromise access 
to or quality of treatment.32 Petrou warns that the government 
must resist the temptation to further increase co-payment, 
as it disproportionately burdens people with lower income 
or more healthcare needs, and he proposes safeguarding of 
access for vulnerable groups through exceptions, setting of 
a maximum ceiling for co-payment, and the introduction of 
a variable co-payment, contingent to patient’s income.33 In a 
different direction, Petrou and Vandoros propose tendering 
for pharmaceuticals as a sustainable and context sensitive cost 
containment approach,34 which could also be an option for 
the Greek government. Also, a recent Cypriot survey with 
semi-structured interviews concludes that the country will 
need to increase the market share of generic medicines to 
contain drug spending.35 This is also an area of reform lagging 
behind in Greece. Recent studies suggest that Greek patients 
are sceptical with the use of generic drugs, questioning their 
safety and effectiveness.36 Therefore, the government needs 
to promote the use of generic medicines by proper education 
and access to reliable information, and by further discounts 
or even zero-cost patient contribution when a generic drug 
is chosen.
Another country whose experience could be valuable for 
Greece is Ireland. Ireland and Greece went through very 
similar economic trials, both receiving bailouts and both 
having to change public spending due to their creditors’ 
demands. In addition, Ireland is similar to Greece in terms 
of pharmaceutical expenditure: in 2009, the level of public 
spending for pharmaceuticals in Ireland was exceeded only 
by Greece, Canada, and the United States, among OECD 
countries.37 When Ireland started implementing cost 
containment strategies, a €0.50 copayment per prescription 
item (capped at €10 per household per month) was introduced 
on the national tax-funded health insurance program for 
low-income individuals and older people, which ended free 
access to prescription medicines.38 Sinnott et al remark that 
this small co-payment had little impact on adherence for 
essential medicines, and a potentially significant reduction 
in use of less-essential medicines that were overprescribed 
before the co-payment – they do note. However, there are 
exceptions and we need a better understanding of the clinical 
consequences of reductions in use of essential medicines, even 
if these reductions are small.38 Ireland has also achieved high 
compliance with policies related to generic drug use, with 
researchers mentioning enactment of supportive legislation, 
acceptability of active-substance based generic substitution 
and the phased nature of the policy introduction as success 
factors.39 Greek policy-makers should explore in detail the 
measures introduced in Ireland, gain insight, and possibly 
co-operate with their Irish counterparts in order to contain 
pharmaceutical costs.
All the above mentioned proposals could be useful in the 
direction of achieving fiscal targets without burdening 
vulnerable populations. However, before all else, an important 
structural problem has to be overcome. Before entering into 
deep recession, Greece had been slow and inefficient in 
making necessary reforms to contain public expenditures, and 
pharmaceutical expenditure amongst them.40 For instance, 
both a 2008 presidential decree41 and a 2010 state law42 with 
regards to prescribing physicians’ and dispensing pharmacists’ 
responsibilities seem to forbid generic substitution. Since 
2010, when the country went essentially bankrupt, successive 
governments have been trying to reform Greece’s economy 
by implementing a variety of measures. These measures have 
not always been properly discussed, as the country’s creditors 
set strict deadlines for their implementation. The new cost-
sharing scheme and the new IRP system are no exceptions. 
They have to be further examined, and policy-makers need 
to consider expert opinions, economic analyses, international 
experience, and patients’ needs, especially for vulnerable 
populations, before making all necessary amendments that 
the creditors should allow. As the Council of Europe suggests, 
new policies related to pharmaceutical expenses need to be 
flexible and constantly subject to revision; that is, they have 
to be able to change drastically if it can be shown that their 
adverse effects in health outweigh financial benefits.43 This 
can be achieved with investment in research to identify which 
policies can cut expenses without unintended consequences,44 
and with the exploration of as many alternative options as 
possible instead of hasty changes in cost-sharing procedures.45 
Cost-sharing can work wonders, but only in the right dosage 
and as part of a broader treatment plan.30
Limitations
This study is subject to certain limitations. First, it was 
conducted in a single region of Greece and included 
prescription samples from only three pharmacies. Although 
there is no reason to expect that prescription flow would 
show major differences in other geographical areas, the 
relatively small sample remains a disadvantage. In addition, 
we systematically excluded high-cost medicinal products for 
the treatment of rare diseases from our study, as they might 
have biased the findings, due to changes in the distribution 
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channels of these products that coincided with the period of 
research. Finally, another limitation is that we were not able 
to link increases in cost-sharing with reductions in drug 
utilization, as the number of prescriptions is not greatly 
affected overall. However, this is something that cannot 
be excluded in the long run, or with a bigger sample. It is 
expected that this study shall be used as a basis for more large-
scale studies in the future, when positive and negative aspects 
of recent reforms shall become more apparent.
Conclusion
Cost-sharing reforms that were recently implemented in 
Greece resulted in significant increases of OOP payments. 
We suggest that, in order to maintain criteria of equitable 
burden sharing and efficient use of resources, patients’ 
contributions must be proportional to income – the poor and 
the elderly cost-sharing ratio should be lower – and inversely 
proportional to health needs – chronic patients should pay 
less depending on the severity of their situation. Greek policy-
makers should be given the opportunity to carefully assess 
all the other viable options regarding pharmaceutical cost 
containment, and adjust cost-sharing schemes to meet the 
needs of vulnerable populations.
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